AB 69: A union
hammer
against non-union workers
Latest enhancement to the compulsory unionism
‘two step’
By Steven
Miller
BusinessNevada
Union bosses
protested Tuesday that they’re not out to “gut”
Nevada’s right-to-work statute.
What they didn’t mention, however, is that the legislation
they’re pushing would remove key worker protections that have
long been part of the nearly 60-year-old state law.
Assembly Bill 69 passed the Legislature’s lower house
unanimously April 26, after the Republican minority accepted
assurances from the Assembly’s Democrat leadership that the
latest version of the bill was innocuous.
At the time there was widespread relief in GOP ranks that the
initial version of AB 69 was no more. In its first
incarnation, the bill would have made Nevada into an “agency
shop” state, where nonunion employees could be made to pay
fees at about the level of union dues to the very unions they
refused to join. Those initial provisions, however, had been
removed from AB 69.
But Tuesday, in a hearing of the Senate Commerce and Labor
Committee, lawmakers heard an entirely different account of
the legislation. Greg Mourad, legislative director the
National Right to Work Committee, based in Washington, D.C.,
told senators that the bill would, in fact, “sabotage”
Nevada’s right-to-work statutes.
In response, Nevada AFL-CIO chief Danny Thompson argued that
AB 69’s overt wording only allows a union to request
“reasonable reimbursement” when it represents nonunion
employees, at their request, in disputes with their employers.
“The bill clearly states the employee must come to us for
representation,” added Thomas Morley, representing Laborers
Local 872 out of Las Vegas.
There is a good deal more to AB 69, however. The bill would
take a highly dubious May 2000 ruling of an infamously
political Nevada Supreme Court and seeks to embed it in Nevada
statutes—before a new, more credible court can revisit the
issue.
What’s more, the ruling in question—Cone v. Service
Employees Union—applied only to government employee
unions. AB 69 seeks to apply that same precedent to every
union worksite in Nevada, whether private sector or public
sector.
“The amended bill was the best we could do in the Assembly and
we were assured it was innocuous,” Assembly Minority Leader
Lynn Hettrick told BusinessNevada. “The assurances were
received in work session after the opposing sides had
negotiated the amendment as an appropriate solution. We did
not know that the Court decision only applied to the public
sector. We learned, after the fact, that the passage of AB69
would apply the decision to the private sector.”
Hettrick said earlier votes by Assembly Republicans against
Democrat bills to micromanage Nevada hospitals demonstrate
that the minority would have voted against AB 69 had its
actual provisions been understood.
“I hate to say it, but we were not aware of the potential
impact of AB69 as amended,” he said. “We do our best, but
occasionally one gets past us.”
What the Cone v. Nevada Service Employees Union case
was really about, according to critics of organized labor, was
a new extension of a right-to-work-infringing tactic sometimes
called “the compulsory-unionism two step.”
Step one is where union bosses lobby politicians for
legislation that gives the union an exclusive monopoly over
representation for all employees in a workplace where
50 percent of the employees, plus one, have voted the union
in.
A good Nevada example is the 1969 Dodge Act, which imposed
this pattern on local government workplaces, legally giving
union brass monopoly control over labor services at those work
sites, while legally requiring the elected representatives of
taxpayers to negotiate with the labor-services monopolists in
good faith.
In step two, the union bosses now go back to the politicians
and complain about the responsibilities that, in step
one, they pressured the politicians to give them.
“Oh, oh,” they wail, in so many words. “The situation is so
unfair. Our monopoly over workplace bargaining turns out to
mean—of all things—a monopoly over workplace bargaining!
Why, we even have to represent all those workers who don’t
want us but we insisted on representing against their will!”
Thus, the first version of AB 69 described itself as “An act …
authorizing an employer to enter into a fair share agreement
with a labor organization which requires employees who are not
members of the labor organization to pay a fee to the labor
organization as a condition for employment….”
Such Orwellian “fair share agreement” language fools no one
any more. That’s why Big Labor continues to roll out and
experiment with new ways to trap unwilling workers so that
they have to keep paying into union coffers.
One such episode was the case that became Cone v. Service
Employees Union. It originated in October 1994 when about
100 employees of the University Medical Center of Southern
Nevada—unhappy with Local 1107 of the Service Employees
International Union—quit that union. The union countered by
announcing a new, hard-nosed policy: henceforth, for providing
the representation service that, under Nevada law, only the
union was legally allowed to provide, it would charge nonunion
workers a new, heavy fee schedule. Soon thereafter, several
former SEIU members, outraged at the union’s new demands,
sought legal assistance from the National Right to Work Legal
Defense Foundation (NRTWLDF).
To make its new “policy” at least somewhat credible, Local
1107, advised by SEIU attorneys, now announced that nonunion
employees would not be required to respect SEIU’s exclusive
representation agreement with the employer, UMC. Instead, said
the union, nonunion workers had the option of selecting their
own outside representatives in grievance matters.
But that, said the employees who had resigned, was not only an
unfair new scheme, but farcical: While SEIU was demanding that
all parties respect and honor the union’s status as a legally
exclusive bargaining agent when it benefited the union, SEIU
also wanted to be able to casually shrug off those same
legally exclusive responsibilities when they became a bit
onerous.
The “policy” couldn’t be divorced from its context, the new
nonunion employees argued, and that was a legal context that
barred them from negotiating their own contracts and required
them to accept employment terms as negotiated by the union.
On the practical level, the union scheme would have required
any nonunion employee who wanted to pursue a grievance to be
personally exposed to thousands of dollars in legal costs—but
even then to only seek enforcement of contract provisions
negotiated and interpreted by the union that employee had
rejected.
It was those and similar reasons, argued Las Vegas attorney
Frank Cremen and the NRTWLDF in a joint brief to the Nevada
Supreme Court, that have led to long-standing precedents all
over the United States—at both federal and state levels—that
bar unions from schemes such as the one SEIU was attempting.
Under those precedents, all unions that win government
recognition as exclusive representatives of bargaining units
must remain exclusive representatives even when nonunion
employees are the ones with the grievance.
To do otherwise, said Cremen and the NRTWLDF, would allow
unions to unfairly abuse workers who do resist joining or want
to resign. And they had a powerful precedent from the National
Labor Relations Board on that very point: “It is noted that it
would take over four years’ worth of dues to pay for the cost
of one single grievance taken to arbitration. This would
necessarily have a coercive effect on nonmembers in their
exercise of their right to join or refrain from joining a
union,” had said the NLRB.
But that and other national precedents were nevertheless
explicitly rejected by the three Nevada judges.
They wrote: “Although appellants cite much precedent,
including NLRB opinions, in support of their position, we
reject this authority ...[and] ... note that this court is not
bound by an NLRB decision....”
Paradoxically in this case, it may have been attorneys for the
nonunion employees who, in retrospect, turn out to have been
collective bargaining’s best friends. That is because Nevada
law (NRS 288.027) defines a bargaining agent as “an employee
organization recognized by the local government employer as
the exclusive representative of all local government employees
in the bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.”
To allow this definition to be ruptured, argued the attorneys
for the employees, “would undermine the whole concept of
collective bargaining.”
The court said, however, that nonunion employees may hire or
designate their own agents to represent them with local Nevada
government entities.
“Indeed, an individual may opt to hire his or her own counsel,
and thereby forgo giving the union any money at all without
fear of losing his or her job,” wrote the panel.
This view differs substantially from the accepted
interpretation in other states of laws like NRS 288.140(2),
said Stefan Gleason, of the NRTWLDF in 2000, when interviewed
for the Nevada Policy Research Institute magazine, Nevada
Journal.
“Many other states have similar statutes on the books, but
those statutes have been interpreted to be meaningless,” said
Gleason. “In fact, the National Labor Relations Act, the
nation’s premier labor law, has similar language, but the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the statute provided no real right of
self-representation.”
The Nevada panel, however, noted that it did not have to
follow those national precedents since state and local
governments, when bargaining with their own employees, “do not
fall within the purview of the National Labor Relations Act.”
The self-contradictory position embraced by the Nevada high
court was evidenced by the terminology that Clark County’s
long-union-dominated Employee-Management Relations Board had
embraced in upholding the union’s “policy.” The board had
itself called the policy “partial non-exclusive
representation.”
Thus the Nevada Supreme Court decision embraced a legal
standard that, from the standpoint of national labor law
precedents, was bizarre. Effectively, it endorsed “partial
non-exclusive representation” and “exclusive representation”
at one and the same time—subject effectively only to union
whim.
The three-judge panel issuing the May 2000 ruling was
comprised of Bob Rose, Bill Maupin and Miriam Shearing. All
three, in July 2003, would vote to declare unconstitutional
the Nevada Constitution’s Gibbons Amendment, which requires
that tax increases be passed by two-thirds super-majorities in
both houses of the Nevada Legislature.
That decision—which elicited a national hailstorm of criticism
and ridicule—turned out to be largely based on a
friend-of-the-court brief filed by teacher union attorneys.
Much of this article was based on earlier reporting that
appeared in Nevada Journal magazine in the fall of
2000, in the article “Fleeing the Collective.”